Introduction
This paper analyzes a principal-agent model in which the agent (manager) can exert e ort in every period in order to gain access to some investment opportunity. He then decides whether the rm undertakes the opportunity. My analysis focuses on satisfactory incentive schemes which motivate the manager to exert e ort and to invest in all pro table projects. As a consequence, the principal's gross bene t is held xed, and the variable of interest is the resulting agency cost, i.e. the present value of all compensation payments to the manager.
The manager's compensation payments are based on a performance measure chosen by the principal. My analysis compares performance measures based only on realized cash ows with the residual income performance measure. I assume that the calculation of residual income is based on depreciation charges which re ect the useful life of assets as well as the intertemporal distribution of cash ows generated by those assets. For suitably chosen depreciation charges, residual income re ects at each point in time the value currently created by the manager. In contrast, performance measures based only on realized cash ows are essentially uninformative about value creation at any intermediate point.
An essential feature of the model is that the manager may have a higher discount rate than the owner. The manager may be more short-term oriented because he puts intrinsically more weight on current consumption, but wealth constraints preclude his borrowing at the interest rate available to the owner. Alternatively, the manager anticipates that outcomes of his current decisions may not be attributable to him because with some exogenous probability he will not stay in his current position.
When the manager's performance measure in each period is based on the history of past cash ows, I nd that any satisfactory incentive system must \backload" the manager's incentive compensation. Since the principal does not know the manager's intertemporal preferences, the manager must be paid a xed salary at all intermediate dates. Any contingent pay scheme which seeks to reward the manager at intermediate dates would necessarily induce biased decisions such that some unpro table projects would be accepted or pro table ones rejected. The objectives of both parties will be aligned regardless of the manager's discount rate if the principal measures performance by the compounded value of all past cash ows at the terminal date. Under this scheme, however, the manager must be paid a premium, since he must be provided with e ort incentives at early dates but will not be rewarded until the terminal date, and since he discounts future payo s at a higher rate. This premium is increasing in the length of the planning horizon. My analysis derives a lower bound on the agency cost under cash based performance measurement, which re ects precisely this premium.
In many situations, the principal (or an accountant working on his behalf) will have some information about the projects undertaken by the rm. In the second part of my analysis, I assume that the principal can assess the intertemporal distribution of a project's cash ows. This information can be used to construct an intertemporal cost allocation which matches the project's periodic cash ows with a proper share of the initial investment cost.
The performance measure resulting from intertemporal cost allocations can be obtained as a combination of accounting income and book value. The variable of choice then is the depreciation schedule. Ramakrishnan 1988], and Reichelstein 1997] have shown that if depreciation is calculated according to the so-called relative bene t depreciation schedule, then residual income achieves the desired matching of periodic cash ows and with a share of the initial investment cost, Specifically, a positive (negative) net present value project then increases residual income in every period. Residual income based on the relative bene t depreciation schedule therefore allows the principal to reward the manager at intermediate dates even without knowledge of the manager's intertemporal preferences.
To derive an upper bound on the resulting agency cost, I examine incentive schemes for which the manager's bonus is proportional to current residual income. The bonus coe cient is chosen to give the manager a su cient incentive to exert e ort. Residual income combined with the relative bene t depreciation schedule ensures that the manager wants to undertake all positive net present value projects, and only those. The resulting incentive scheme is stationary in the sense that the agency cost per period is constant and independent of the length of the planning horizon. While it may be possible to construct better e.g. non-linear incentive schemes, the schemes I analyze yield an e ective upper bound.
My main result establishes that the agency cost of satisfactory incentive schemes is lower under residual income based on the relative bene t depreciation schedule than under a performance measure based only on realized cash ows. In particular, I demonstrate that the lower bound on the agency cost resulting from cash ow based performance measures exceeds the corresponding upper bound resulting from the use of residual income. Furthermore, the relative cost of incentive schemes based only on cash ows increases exponentially as the planning horizon goes to in nity. Anctil, Jordan and Mukherji 1997] , information is dispersed among several agents. Ignoring incentive issues, these authors show that if managers myopically maximize the residual income of their respective departments, the rm will converge towards long-run optimal asset and production levels.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 examines incentive schemes based on past cash ows. Proposition 1 shows that any satisfactory incentive schemes must backload the agent's bonus to the nal date. Section 4 analyzes the residual income performance measure when depreciation charges can be based on additional information pertaining to the intertemporal distribution of cash ows. Extensions of the basic model are discussed in Section 5, and conclusions in Section 6.
The Model
A principal (owner) hires an agent (manager) for T periods, and commits to an incentive scheme which compensates the agent at date t on the basis of some performance measure t . The manager can exert e ort in each period to gain access to an investment opportunity; if the manager does not exert the required level of e ort, the rm has no investment opportunity at that time.
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Upon seeing the currently available investment project, the agent decides whether the rm adopts the project. The manager makes this decision because he is better informed about the project's 5 pro tability than the owner. The owner would like the manager to adopt all projects with positive net present value , and only those. The owner cannot infer whether the project was not undertaken because the manager decided against it, or because there was no investment opportunity due to lack of e ort.
I refer to an incentive scheme as goal congruent if the manager is never worse (better) o by accepting a project with positive (negative) net present value. Thus, a constant salary would satisfy the requirement of goal congruence, though the manager would obviously have no incentive to exert e ort. An incentive system is satisfactory if it satis es goal congruence, provides the manager with incentives to exert e ort, and induces him to stay on the job (i.e., he is paid at least his market alternative). The principal objective of this paper is to identify the agency cost associated with satisfactory incentive schemes, i.e., the present value of expected compensation payments to the agent.
The project available at date t, denoted by P t , consists of an (n + 1) tuple P t = (b t ; c t1 ; : : : ; c tn ); where b t denotes the initial cash investment associated with the project at date t, and c ti represents the cash ow at date t + i, where 1 i n, and n > 1. Since T is the terminal date, let t 2 f0; 1; : : :; Tg so that the last investment decision is made at date T ? n.
Cash from operations at date t is:
where I(P i ) = 1 if project P i was undertaken, and I(P i ) = 0 if P i was rejected. Expression (1) presumes that t n (if t < n, the summation starts at i = 0, since the rst available project is P 0 ). All cash ows go directly to the principal, who also makes the cash payments for all investments approved by the manager.
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The principal discounts future payo s at the discount factor , where (1+r) ?1 and r denotes the principal's cost of capital. Accordingly, the principal would like the agent to adopt P t if:
For convenience, I presume that the initial cash investment is a cash out ow; the analysis will, however, accommodate the possibility of \loans", where the initial investment is a cash in ow.
The cash ows associated with P t are known to the manager (provided he exerts e ort at date t) but not to the owner. 4 Any project P t not accepted at date t is irretrievably lost, but this decision has no impact on future investment opportunities. Projects are drawn independently according to some probability distribution whose support is P R n+1 . Given the probability measure , the ex ante probability of a pro table project will be denoted by p Prob NPV(P t ) 0]. We also assume that satis es the requirement E NPV(P t ) j NPV(P t ) 0] < 1.
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Since projects are drawn independently from a time invariant distribution, the expected value of NPV(P t ) is the same at all dates t with t < T ? n. I assume that the agent's discount factor, , can be less than . As discussed in the Introduction, a higher discount rate may result because the manager is intrinsically less patient but he cannot borrow money at the principal's interest rate. Alternatively, the manager's relative impatience may re ect his belief that future outcomes will not be attributed to him either because rm is reorganized or because he leaves his current position.
The principal is assumed to know ex ante only that 2 ; ]. My analysis ignores the possibility of \screening" the agent by o ering him a menu of compensation schemes. In order for the incentive scheme to be satisfactory, it has to induce the desired behavior from the agent for all 2 ; ].
If the agent exerts e ort, his utility at date t is given by: u t = z t ? v e t , where z t denotes the compensation payment at date t, v represents the cost of e ort, and e t 2 f0; 1g denotes the e ort variable. Compensation to the manager is assumed to be determined as:
where k t is a constant, and g t ( ) is some strictly increasing function of the performance measure t . The principal chooses both k t and g t ( ) so as to minimize the cost of providing the desired incentives. The structure of the compensation payments in (3) allows the agent's compensation to be independent of the performance measure t . However, if z t becomes strictly increasing in t at some critical level t , it must also be strictly increasing thereafter.
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I impose the condition that k t 0 to re ect that the agent's compensation cannot be negative due to wealth constraints..
To summarize the manager declares at date t whether or not he will stay with the rm for the next period. If he stays and exerts e ort, that is, e t = 1, he also decides whether the rm undertakes project P t . These actions and decisions are taken \shortly" after date t, i.e., at the beginning of period t + 1 (which starts at date t and ends at date t + 1). As a consequence, the investment decision regarding P t does not a ect the performance measure t but only the future t+ .
If the manager were to leave the rm at date t, he could earn his market alternative u which would be paid at date t for the period t + 1.
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Since that the agent cannot commit himself upfront to staying on the job, he will leave whenever the present value of future market alternatives exceeds the expected compensation from the current 8 job. 8 My notion of satisfactory incentive schemes presumes that the principal wants to retain the manager even if he has not uncovered any pro table projects in the past.
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Since the last investment decision is made at date T ? n, the manager will always seek external employment starting at date T ? n + 1, but he may receive \deferred compensation" at the last n dates.
Finally, my analysis does not attempt to identify optimal incentive schemes. In particular, the upper and lower bounds for the agency cost of satisfactory incentive schemes are independent of the underlying probability measure . In general, though, one would expect the optimal incentive scheme to depend on as well as on u and v. (4) where 0 is the coe cient on cash from operations in the current period, 1 is the coe cient for cash from operations obtained in the previous period, and so on up the rst cash in ow. Since the investment decision about project P t is assumed to be made at the beginning of period t + 1, the most recent investment cash ow re ected in t is b t?1 , and its coe cient is 1 .
To obtain a lower bound on the agency cost resulting from the performance measures in (4), I rst characterize the entire class of satisfactory incentive systems. In particular, I demonstrate that the desired incentives require the compensation rules g t ( ) and k t to be such that the agent is paid a xed salary at all intermediate dates. Therefore, any incentive payment must be \backloaded" to the nal date T. Furthermore, the coe cients i and i must be chosen so the terminal performance measure T is proportional to the compounded value of all cash ows.
For an intuitive argument why the manager cannot be rewarded at intermediate dates, consider a setting with a single project P 0 , so that T = n. If the domain of possible projects P is su ciently rich, then any given NPV can be generated by a variety of projects which di er only in the intertemporal distribution of the cash ows.
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Goal congruence requires that the agent be indi erent between accepting and rejecting any zero NPV project. Since the agent's discount factor, , is unknown to the principal, the only way to satisfy this requirement for a rich set of zero NPV projects is for the agent to receive a xed salary at all intermediate dates.
At the terminal date T the performance measure must coincide (up to a normaliz-ing constant) with the compounded value of all past cash ows. Other coe cients i and i would bias the agent's decision making, i.e., he could be better o by accepting some unpro table projects, or alternatively, by rejecting some pro table projects.
I make two assumptions about the domain of possible projects P, i.e., the support of the probability measure .
Assumption ( If the scaling parameter a is (without loss of generality) set equal to one, the resulting performance measure becomes the compounded value of all past cash ows:
The coe cients 1 ; : : : ; n?1 are indeterminate since the performance measure is irrelevant at intermediate dates, and there are no investment decisions to be made at the last n dates.
The proof of Proposition 1 (in the Appendix) proceeds by backward induction. Given any history of projects, the manager cannot be rewarded for his e orts on the last project P T?n until its cash ows from that project have been realized at date T. For the penultimate project P T?n?1 , the principal is also forced to delay the agent's reward to date T. Even though this project is completed at date T ?1, its cash ows can, by assumption, not be separated from the cash ows generated by project P T?n . Proceeding inductively, it follows that any bonus payment must be delayed to the nal date T.
12
I note that this line of reasoning would fail if projects were undertaken at one date and completed at the next date,i.e., n = 1. Cash ow based performance measurement would then entail no friction provided investment and operating cash ows can be separated. Given any incentive system, the agency cost borne by the principal is the present value of expected compensation payments to the agent E 0 Proposition 2 Given (A1)-(A2), suppose performance measurement is based on past cash ows. The agency cost of satisfactory incentive schemes, ? CF T , then satis es the lower bound:
Proof. See Appendix.
To interpret the lower bound in (5), note that under the rst-best solution the agent could be paid u + v in each period. As shown in Proposition 1, however, the agent's incentive compensation must be \backloaded" to date T when performance evaluation can be based on all past cash ows. For an agent with discount factor the minimal payment must then be at least v ?(T?t) at date t. In the worst case = , and the present value cost of the e ort compensation payment becomes ? T?t v. The inequality in (5) can be derived by a successive application of the incentive and participation constraints at all intermediate dates: for any history of projects the agent must be willing to exert e ort and stay on the job. An agent whose discount factor exceeds will earn rents, which result entirely from the need to defer compensation to the terminal date T under cash-ow-based performance measurement.
Although it is an open question whether the lower bound in (5) is attainable, I note that when the agent's incentive scheme is linear in T = T?n X t=0 t NPV (P t ) I(P t ); the resulting agency cost will generally exceed the bound in (5). With a linear compensation scheme, the agent will be paid z t = w t 0 for 0 t T ? 1, and z T = w T + s ~ T . In order to satisfy the e ort incentive compatibility constraint at all times, the minimal slope coe cient is:
At date 0, the agent's expected bonus payment at the terminal time T becomes:
Furthermore, it is readily veri ed that the participation constraints require the xed payments, w t , to satisfy the inequality: The preceding analysis supposed that the principal can rely only on past cash ows to create the desired managerial incentives. In many situations, however, the prin-cipal will have some information about a project's cash ow pattern without being able to observe its actual net present value. This section demonstrates that accrual accounting provides a natural way of incorporating such project speci c information into the agent's performance measure, and that the resulting incentive schemes based on residual income are advantageous for the principal. The additional information assumed to be available concerns to the intertemporal distribution of project cash ows. Following , I assume the cash in ow in period t + i from project P t is c ti = y t x ti for 1 i n. Here, y t is a \pro tability parameter" known only to the manager, and the x ti 's are \distributional" parameters assumed to be known also to an outside observer who works on behalf of the principal, such as an accountant. In many settings it is plausible that the accountant not only knows the useful life of an asset, but he can also assess the pattern of cash ows generated by an asset, e.g. cash ows are uniform over time, or they increase (decrease) at a particular rate.
For example, suppose the investment project involves a new factory whose operating cash ow in period t + i is determined by physical capacity, x ti , and the unit contribution margin (per unit of capacity), y t . Capacity may vary over time as production of the plant rst needs to be \ramped up", while maintenance and repairs may diminish capacity later on. The basic premise then is that an accountant, who works on behalf of the principal, can assess the distribution of future capacity levels (x t1 ; : : : ; x tn ), once the manager has decided to build the plant, but cannot predict reliably the unit contribution margin, y t , of the output produced.
Knowledge of the vector X t (x t1 ; : : : ; x tn ) allows the principal to allocate the investment cost, b t , across the n periods of a project's useful life. suggests that the manager be charged f ti (X t ) b t in period t + i for the investment undertaken in period t, where: f ti (X t ) = x ti X t ~ :
Here,~ is a column vector in R n with components ( ; 2 ; : : : ; n ), so that X t ~ = x ti i . At date t + i, the di erence between the cash ow, c ti , and the allocated cost for project P t then becomes: y t x ti ? f ti (X t ) b t = x ti y t ? 1 X t ~ b t = x ti X t ~ y t X t ~ ? b t ] : (7) The expression in brackets on the right-hand side of (7) is just the NPV of P t .
14 Thus, the cost allocation scheme in (6) e ectively \annualizes" a project's NPV without requiring knowledge of the actual NPV. If performance is measured by current cash ow less charges for the cost of earlier investments, then goal congruence is achieved regardless of the manager's discount rate: a positive (negative) NPV project increases (decreases) the performance measure in every period, provided x ti 0. 15 In fact, in period t + i the project contributes an x ti X t ~ share of the overall NPV of P t . The intertemporal cost allocation scheme in (6) does not correspond to a conventional depreciation schedule since the sum of the cost charges exceeds the initial investment cost. Nonetheless, the performance measure in (7) can be obtained as a linear combination of income and book value, with income equal to cash ow minus depreciation. To implement the desired intertemporal cost allocation, the depreciation charges must re ect the information X t .
I It is readily veri ed that the resulting depreciation schedule is indeed \tidy", i.e., the sum of the depreciation charges is equal to one. In the special case of uniform cash ows, i.e., when x t1 = x ti for 1 i n, the relative bene t depreciation schedule reduces to the annuity depreciation method. This depreciation method results in identical contributions to residual income in each period; see, for example, Solomons 1965] , Kaplan 1982] , and Anthony, Bradford and Dearden 1989] .
The result stated in Proposition 3 below is based on an incentive system in which the principal adopts the relative bene t depreciation schedule, and rewards the manager in proportion to current residual income. The bonus coe cient is su cient to compensate the manager for his e ort. For a manager with discount factor this incentive constraint holds with equality. Before stating this result, I impose an assumption on the domain of possible projects: Assumption (A3): For every P 2 P, with P = (b; c 1 ; : : : ; c n ), there exist numbers y and (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) such that x i 0 and c i = y x i .
It follows from (A3) that the operating cash ows are either all positive (y 0) or all negative (y 0). Proposition 3 Given (A3), suppose the performance measure is residual income based on the relative bene t depreciation schedule. The resulting agency cost of satisfactory incentive schemes, ? RI T , satis es: Here Y i is a positive constant given by
Since all projects are drawn independently from a time invariant probability distribution (i.e., ), the expression in brackets on the right-hand side of (14) is independent of t. In particular, it does not matter whether this expectation is computed at date zero or at any date prior to time t. As demonstrated above, if the performance measure is residual income and depreciation is calculated according to the relative bene t depreciation schedule, then a positive NPV project P t contributes x ti X t ~ NPV(P t ) to residual income at date t + i. The number Y i is therefore just the expected value of that contribution. By de nition,
To induce a manager with discount factor to exert e ort at date t, it is necessary and su cient that: s
This constraint will be satis ed as a strict inequality unless = . Since the manager is paid his market alternative u as salary in each period, he is willing to stay on the job regardless of the number of rejected projects in the past. Thus the incentive system described here is satisfactory. The resulting agency cost to the principal becomes:
It is well known that for any sequence of projects and any depreciation schedule the present value of cash ows is equal to the present value of residual incomes:
t NPV(P t ) I(P t ) : (15) Since the agent rejects all negative NPV projects it follows that
Equations (14){ (16) show that the agency cost for the linear incentive scheme based on residual income is:
Finally, is indeed less than or equal to
and this last inequality holds since Y i 0 and > . 2
Using residual income based on the relative bene t depreciation schedule, it is no longer necessary to delay the agent's incentive compensation to the terminal date T. Instead the agent is compensated for his e ort at date t in each of the next n periods, since a pro table project contributes to residual income in each of those n periods. Also, the linearity of the performance measure makes it possible to aggregate e ectively the contributions of all currently active projects. Speci cally, residual income at date t is a weighted average of the NPV's of the projects accepted in the last n periods, i.e., RI t = t?1 X i=t?n x i;t?i X i ~ NPV (P i ) I(P i ) ; provided t n. Finally, linearity of the compensation scheme ensures that the agent's incentives at date t do not depend on either the project history or on anticipated future opportunities.
Since the agent can now be rewarded for each project in the course of that project's life, the resulting agency cost per project, i.e., u+ v, does not depend on the length of the planning horizon, T. While the solution derived in Proposition 3 deviates from the rst-best, the resulting distortion in agency costs is bounded above by To state the main result of this paper, I will use the terminology that a sequence of real-valued numbers f T g, T 2 N, converges to at an exponential rate if there exist numbers`0 and`1, such that 0 <`1 < 1, and j T ? j `0 `T 1 for all T 2 N.
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Proposition 4 Given (A1)-(A3) and any planning horizon T, the agency cost of satisfactory incentive schemes is lower under residual income based on the relative bene t depreciation schedule than under any performance measure based on realized cash ows only, i.e., ? RI T < ? CF T :
Furthermore, the ratio of agency costs ? RI T ? CF T converges to zero at an exponential rate as T ! 1. Proof: See Appendix.
The rst claim in Proposition 4 follows directly by noting that the lower bound for ? CF T , as given in Proposition 2, exceeds the upper bound for ? RI T as derived in Proposition 3. Even for a single project, i.e., when T = n, residual income leads to a strictly lower agency cost than cash ow based performance evaluation by making it possible for the agent to be rewarded at intermediate dates. As the number of projects increases, the relative performance of cash ow based incentive schemes worsens dramatically as evidenced by exponential convergence. depreciation charges must be ones in (11). In particular, this result implies that by itself accounting income could not possibly generate a satisfactory incentive scheme regardless of the choice of depreciation policy. This uniqueness result also implies that if the agent's performance measure is based on current accounting information, then any improvement on the upper bound in (13) would have to result from compensation functions g t ( ) that are non-linear functions of residual income.
Extensions
I now outline several extensions of the basic model, and examines the validity of my results in these settings. Suppose rst that even the manager does not know the project cash ows for sure. Speci cally, the actual cash ow in period t + i, c ti could be a random variable whose expected value is x ti y t , i.e., E t c ti j X t ; y t ] = x ti y t .
The lower bound in Proposition 2 would still apply, and the upper bound derived in Proposition 3 would still hold provided the agent's limited liability constraint (z t 0) is not violated. For the linear scheme analyzed in Proposition 3 to be feasible, the support of eachc ti must not be \too large". Speci cally, the permissible support forc ti decreases with the size of the bonus coe cient s = v P i Y i p , but increases with the size of the xed salary u.
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The depreciation charges would not have to be recalculated if actual cash ows di er from those originally projected.
My main result relied on assumption (A3) which restricts the domain of possible projects. It is possible to relax the requirement that all distribution parameters x ti , be non-negative. As argued above, a positive NPV project will increase residual income in each period, if all x ti 0. To attain goal congruence, however, it su ces that a positive (negative) NPV project makes a positive (negative) overall contribution to the agent's compensation. Provided the agent is paid an identical share of residual income in each period (the bonus coe cient s in Proposition 3) and depreciation is calculated according to the relative bene t rule, project P t results in the following total contribution to the agent's compensation:
To ensure goal congruence, it is therefore su cient that the vector X t belongs to the subset of R n + which is de ned by the requirement that P n i=1 x ti i 0 for all 2 ; ].
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Since this set contains R n + as a proper subset, we conclude that Propositions 3 and 4 can generalize to settings with positive and negative project cash ows. In this context, it should be noted that depreciation charges can be negative (i.e., the asset appreciates) under the relative bene t rule. In particular, this will be true in period t + i, if x ti is su ciently close to zero.
So far I have assumed that the agent may leave the rm at any time, but the compensation scheme induces him to stay. Alternatively, suppose the agent can e ectively commit himself to stay for T periods. The incentive scheme then would have to satisfy only the initial participation constraint at date 0, recognizing the stream of market alternatives the agent foregoes by committing to stay. However, the incentive scheme would not have to satisfy any interim participation constraints.
While Proposition 1 would not be a ected by the possibility of \locking" the agent into the relationship at date 0, the lower bound on the agency cost derived in Proposition 2 would change. Because of the di erence in discount rates, the principal would like to pay the agent as early as possible, though the limited liability constraints impose bounds on the gains available from upfront compensation. Following the arguments in the proof of Proposition 2, the incentive constraints yield the following 24 lower bound on the agency cost:
Here, k 0 is the initial xed payment which must be chosen so that the date 0 participation constraint:
k 0 + If the agent can commit to stay for T periods, the upper bound on the agency cost under residual income (i.e., the bound in (13)) can be improved as well. Even without this improvement, we note that on the basis of (13) alone Proposition 4 continues to hold in the following sense: ? RI T <? CF T for T su ciently large, and the ratio ? RI T =? CF T converges to zero at an exponential rate. Thus, irrespective of the nature of the participation constraints, cash ow based performance measurement will ultimately be dominated because incentive payments must be deferred to the terminal date T, and the cost of deferred compensation increases rapidly with the length of the horizon.
Concluding Remarks
In a principal-agent setting, I have compared performance measures based only on realized cash ows with the residual income performance measure when depreciation 25 charges re ect the intertemporal distribution of project cash ows. I have shown that by comparison residual income economizes on the agency cost necessary to provide incentives for the manager. Allocating investment costs over time matches project cash ows with a share of the initial cost so that residual income re ects the value created by the manager at any given point in time. In contrast, cash ows are informative about value creation only at the end of the planning horizon.
The model analyzed in this paper has idealized the role of the accounting system. While I have assumed that outside parties such as accountants can perfectly assess the intertemporal distribution of the project cash ows, it is conceivable that my main result could carry over to settings in which the accountant is less knowledgeable and therefore matching is imperfect. That seems particularly plausible for long planning horizons since, my results demonstrate that the performance of cash ow based incentive systems degenerates dramatically as the planning horizon grows larger. Imperfect matching may then still allow for better incentive provisions than no matching at all. Since 2 ; ], equation (22) de nes a polynomial of degree 2 in , and therefore both coe cients of the polynomial must be zero. It follows that: z 3 (P 0 ; P 1 ; P 2 ) maxfk 3 ; g 3 ( 3 (P 0 ; P 1 ; P 2 ))g = z 3 (P 0 ; P 1 ; 0) maxfk 3 ; g 3 ( 3 (P 0 ; P 1 ; 0))g
for all possible projects P 2 with NPV(P 2 ) = 0. Suppose now that, contrary to the claim, there exists a 3 such that g 3 ( 3 ) > k 3 for 3 > 3 , and furthermore i > 0 for some i, 0 i 2. The expression for 3 (P 0 ; P 1 ; P 2 ), as given in (20), shows that for any project P 2 , we can nd P 0 and P 1 such that 3 (P 0 ; P 1 ; 0) > 3 and 3 (P 0 ; P 1 ; P 2 ) > 3 . Thus since g 3 ( ) is increasing in its argument, it follows from (22) There must exist 4 such that g 4 ( 4 ) > k 4 for 4 > 4 , for otherwise the agent would have no incentive to investigate P 2 at date 2. Applying the same sequence of arguments as above, it follows that for properly chosen P 0 and P 1 : For this equality to hold, it must be that 1 = 2 = 0. But that would leave the agent indi erent towards all projects P 2 at date 2, contradicting that the incentive scheme is satisfactory. This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: Either g 2 ( 2 ) < k 2 for all 2 , or i 0 for 0 i 1.
Proof: At date 1, the manager's utility associated with project P 1 becomes: z 2 (P 0 ; P 1 ) + 2 E 1 z 3 (P 0 ; P 1 ;P 2 )] + 3 E 1 z 4 (P 0 ; P 1 ;P 2 )] ;
where E 1 z 3 (P 0 ; P 1 ;P 2 )] p E 1 maxfk 3 ; g 3 ( 2 (P 0 ; P 1 ;P 2 )g j NPV (P 2 ) > 0] +(1 ? p) maxfk 3 ; g 3 ( 3 (P 0 ; P 1 ; 0))g ; and whenever NPV (P 1 ) = 0. The same reasoning as in Step 1 then shows that either g 2 ( 2 ) < k 2 for all 2 or 0 0 and 1 0.
Step 3: Either g 1 ( 1 ) < k 1 for all 1 , or 0 0.
Going back to the investment decision at date 0, we know from the previous steps that z 1 (P 0 ) = z 1 (0) for all projects P 0 with NPV (P 0 ) = 0. Equivalently: 
Substituting (28) into (27) Steps 1{3 have shown that the agent will never earn a bonus at intermediate dates.
Thus a satisfactory incentive system requires that for some 4 , g 4 ( 4 ) > k 4 whenever z 4 (P 0 ; P 1 ; P 2 ) = z 4 (P 0 ; P 1 ; 0) ; or equivalently, 4 (P 0 ; P 1 ; P 2 ) = 4 (P 0 For the agent to have any incentives regarding P 2 , it cannot be the case that 0 = 1 = 2 = 0. This establishes parts (i){(ii) of Proposition 1.
To identify the remaining coe cients ( 2 ; 3 ; 3 ; 4 ) in the performance measure, consider the investment decision at date 1. Since is unknown to the principal, goal congruence requires that: E 1 z 4 (P 0 ; P 1 ;P 2 )] = E 1 z 4 (P 0 ; P 1 ;P 2 )]
31 whenever NPV (P 1 ) = 0. Here E 1 z 4 (P 0 ; P 1 ;P 2 )] = p E 1 maxfk 4 ; g 4 ( 4 (P 0 ; P 1 ;P 2 )g j NPV (P 2 ) > 0] + (1 ? p) maxfk 4 ; g 4 ( 4 (P 0 ; P 1 ; 0))g 
